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In an earlier article in this journal,1 I focused on the matter of the enforceability of a 
promise to pay money in the event certain lands were to be used for an energy-related 
activity (e.g., the placement of solar arrays, the erection of wind turbines, or the construc-
tion of oil storage tanks). Central attention was given to the enforceability of any such 
promise against successors in interest to land to which the promise relates—a topic that 
concentrated on the property law mysteries surrounding the runnability of real covenants 
and equitable servitudes. Intimately related issues were also considered. This included the 
possible significance of relevant successors taking less than the entire quantity of land first 
bound by the energy-related activity.2 And whether it proved a complication that the prom-
ise to pay first appeared in a grant, conveyance, or declaration in favor of a beneficiary 
established by a grantor who transferred the land concerned to an original transferee of a 
                                                 
* Phyllis Hurley Frey Professor of Law (2010-2013), and Sustainable Energy Resources Law Program Fellow, 
University of Tulsa; J.S.D. (1987) and W.B. Cutting Fellow (1980-81), Columbia University Law School. 
 1. Rex J. Zedalis, A Promise to Pay Money if Transferred Land is Used for Identified Energy-Related Ac-
tivity: Can Successors of the Promisor be Bound?, 50 TULSA L. REV. 805 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 814-18. 
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chain of title holders connected to the successors now said obligated by the promise.3 
As that article made clear, it offered no assessment of at least two potential additional 
concerns. First, whether a burden otherwise capable of running to a successor of the orig-
inal covenantee indeed passes to that successor, in the event the nature of the correspond-
ing benefit created by the burden is characterized as “personal” or “in gross.”4 Second, 
whether the fact that the promise to pay is triggered only by the uncertain occurrence of 
use of the subject land for the identified energy-related activity causes it to be a contin-
gency subject to possible invalidation under the rule against perpetuities?5 What follows 
aims at briefly and succinctly taking up both of those additional concerns, with an eye 
towards the possibility that Oklahoma law may be predisposed towards handling either the 
matter of the rule against perpetuities, or that of a burden’s ability to run when its corre-
sponding benefit is personal or in gross, in one particular fashion as opposed to another. 
II. RUNNING A BURDEN WHEN THE BENEFIT IS PERSONAL OR IN GROSS 
As examined at length in the earlier article, the burden of a covenant or servitude, as 
well as the corresponding benefit of that covenant or servitude, can either “touch and con-
cern” land, or not. In the context of a transferee of a piece of land taking on a promise to 
pay money if such land is ever used for an identified energy related activity, that means 
that the promise itself (i.e., the burden of payment), as well as the benefit to which it gives 
rise (i.e., the potential receipt of the payment), could be, or not be, about the transferred 
land, relate to that land, or centered or focused on that land. Certainly there can be no 
dispute that any such promise, accompanied by the intent that the promise bind each future 
transferee, is a promise of the sort that would evidence a burden that touches and concerns 
the land. After all, it is the use of the transferred land for some identified energy activity 
that triggers the obligation to make the payment that is the essence of the promise itself. 
The promise burdens the land by conditioning its use for a certain set of activities upon 
the payment of certain sums of money. Avoidance of having to satisfy that promise is 
secured by not using the land concerned for the burdened activities. In contradistinction to 
the payment promise’s connection to the burden, however, the benefit does not affect land. 
No land is benefited by the burden of payment. Instead, payments resulting from any 
breach of the condition not to use the relevant land for an identified energy activity simply 
go to enhancing the fiscal or economic position of the payment’s beneficiary. 
This is unlike a situation in which the burden of a money payment is to go to making 
improvements on some other piece of land left in the hands of the original transferor when 
burdened property is conveyed to the initial transferee. In such a case, the promise to make 
payment that burdens particular land gives rise to a corresponding benefit to some other 
land retained by the original transferor. Rather, in the situation with which we are con-
fronted, a burden that is about land—one which relates to, touches, and concerns land—
gives rise to a corresponding benefit that serves the mere financial well-being, the personal 
economic security of some individual beneficiary, and does not constitute something that 
                                                 
 3. Id. at 818-22. 
 4. Id. at 827. 
 5. Id. 
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redounds to the benefit of a particular piece of land. As a consequence, our situation in-
volving a promise to make money payment when transferred land is used for an identified 
energy related activity pairs a burden that touches and concerns land with a benefit that is 
personal or in gross; and, it is oft-cited hornbook law that the ability of a burden otherwise 
capable of running to a successor-in-interest to the original promisor (because the burden 
is appurtenant to land that has passed from the promisor to their successor) can have its 
runnability affected adversely by the personal or in gross nature of its corresponding ben-
efit. This has certainly been the case where enforcement of the burden is sought under the 
law of real covenants, with some divergence of opinion where enforcement is sought under 
the more generous principles relative to equitable servitudes.  
A well-known decision relying on just such an approach is Caullett v. Stanley Stil-
well & Sons, Inc.6 After struggling with the notion of the burden involved being one that 
truly and genuinely touched and concerned the relevant land, the Superior Court of New 
Jersey noted that, even assuming the burden involved be of such an appurtenant nature, 
the corresponding benefit to which the burden gave rise still remained personal or in 
gross.7 Given that fact, along with the long-standing rule that the law will not allow the 
burden of a real covenant to run when its corresponding benefit fails to touch and concern 
land of the one seeking to enforce the burden,8 the court turned its attention to whether the 
same such rule applied at equity, were the burden sought to be enforced not as a covenant, 
but as an equitable servitude. On that score, the court indicated that although a split existed 
between jurisdictions,9 the rule to be applied to equitable servitudes in New Jersey was 
precisely the same as the rule applied in regard to enforcing real covenants at law: obliga-
tions associated with a burden will run to successors-in-interest from the original promisor 
only when giving rise to a corresponding benefit that touches and concerns land.10 It mat-
ters not that the burden itself is irrefutably appurtenant, and would, thus, otherwise be 
capable of running. Whether at law or at equity, for an appurtenant burden to actually run 
to a successor of the burdened land, it must give rise to a corresponding benefit that touches 
and concerns land of the party seeking to enforce the burden. If the benefit is in gross or 
personal in nature, and is not in fact providing a benefit to other land, the burden that would 
otherwise run has its runnability impeded. Such a result gives effect to the notion that 
burdens should not readily be imposed upon those not directly undertaking them merely 
because they happen subsequently to have acquired an interest in land upon which such 
burdens rest. 
Focusing on equitable principles and the running of the burden side of an equitable 
servitude, the jurisdictions diverging from the position taken by New Jersey in the Caullett 
                                                 
 6. Caullett v. Stanley Stilwell & Sons, Inc., 170 A.2d 52 (N.J. 1961). 
 7. Id. at 55. 
 8. Id. at 56. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. (citing Welitoff v. Kohl, 147 A. 390, 393 (N.J. 1929)). 
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decision11 include at least New Hampshire,12 Kentucky,13 Pennsylvania,14 Michigan,15 
Georgia,16 and Illinois.17 Decisions in those jurisdictions have permitted the running of a 
burden that touches and concerns lands passed to a successor-in-interest, despite the fact 
such a burden has given rise to a corresponding benefit that can be labeled as merely per-
sonal or in gross in nature. In allowing such to run, those states appear not only to have 
favored the view of equity as a device to ameliorate the harshness of results often produced 
by the strict application of rules of law governing real covenants, but they have also ra-
tionalized their approach by insisting that one who has notice of the existence of an appur-
tenant burden should not be entitled to escape its obligations when taking lands thereby 
affected, and that such known burdens, taken on freely, should be honored. In other words, 
the mere fact that the nature of the benefit arising from a burden, which is clearly placed 
upon lands, exemplifies itself as inuring to the financial advantage of some person or legal 
entity, should not prevent the burden itself from running to a successor-in-interest when 
the burden is known to that successor. 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire’s decision in Pratte v. Balatsos is illustra-
tive.18 That decision did not involve a factual situation in which a promise regarding the 
use of certain lands was taken on in the context of a conveyance of the burdened land 
between the so-called covenantor and covenantee of the promise. Nonetheless, the deci-
sion is clear on the point that, once a covenantor agrees to subject their land to a burden 
that is indisputable in its capacity to affix itself to that promisor’s land, that burden be-
comes able to run to a successor-in-interest to that land, even though the corresponding 
benefit to which the burden gives rise is one that can only be characterized as personal or 
in gross, because of merely redounding to the individual advantage of the promise’s cov-
enantee. In the exact words of the decision, under such a situation there can be found to 
exist an obligation or promise “enforceable in equity . . . even if it be not regarded as an 
agreement running with the land upon which an action at law could be maintained.”19 Not-
ing that the in gross or personal nature of the benefit redounding to the covenantee was 
accompanied by clear notice of the relevant promise on the part of the original covenan-
tor’s successor, the court relied upon Pomeroy’s tome on Equity Jurisprudence for the 
proposition that “the doctrine that a purchaser with notice of a covenant with respect to the 
use of land takes subject to the covenant may be explained ‘by regarding the covenant as 
creating an equitable easement.’”20 
Adding to this is the Supreme Court of Michigan’s decision in Staebler-Kempf Oil 
                                                 
 11. See generally Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Con    
text of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 470-71 (1984) (indicating that the approach 
in Caullett might represent the so-called majority approach).  
 12. Pratte v. Balatsos, 113 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1955). 
 13. Trosper v. Shoemaker, 227 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1949).  
 14. Bald Eagle Valley R.R. v. Nittany Valley R.R., 33 A. 239 (Pa. 1895). 
 15. Staebler-Kempf Oil Co. v. Mac’s Auto Mart, 45 N.W.2d 316 (Mich. 1951).  
 16. Smith v. Gulf Refining Co., 134 S.E. 446 (Ga. 1926).  
 17. Van Sant v. Rose, 103 N.E. 194 (Ill. 1913).  
 18. Pratte v. Balatsos, 113 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1955). 
 19. Id. at 495. 
 20. Id. 
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Co. v. Mac’s Auto Mart.21 The factual situation in that decision is distinguishable from 
Pratte. The Michigan case involved a straightforward instance wherein a covenantee made 
a conveyance of lands to a covenantor who promised, in return, to purchase from the con-
venantee transferring the lands, certain specified products the convenantee was in the busi-
ness of distributing. Further, the promise was said in the instrument articulating it to be 
one running with the land. The court was entirely satisfied that those who subsequently 
came into possession of the land were aware of the existence of the promise to purchase 
the concerned products being linked to the original land transfer because the deed granted 
to the successor contained the very language of the promise itself. The court thus expressed 
little reluctance to invoking equity to enforce observance of the promise.  
The decision of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Trosper v. Shoemaker likewise 
captures the exact same idea.22 As the court puts it, “[h]aving accepted title with [a] con-
dition imposed on it, and which condition was shown in the deed to be a part of the con-
sideration for the conveyance, [the covenantor-grantee] is bound  by [the condition].”23 
Nonetheless, it is clear that Trosper involved not the question of whether the runnability 
of the original covenant was impeded at equity by the fact of the benefit created through 
the imposition of the specific burden involved being personal or in gross in nature, but 
rather the question of whether a covenant giving rise to a purely personal or in gross benefit 
could be enforced against the original covenantor by one who was a successor to the orig-
inal covenantee. In spite of this important difference, there can be no doubt of the court’s 
insistence that promises once lawfully made are to be enforced at equity. 
Apart from the cases just examined, it is worthwhile to recall some of the language 
from the Supreme Court of Illinois in Van Sant v. Rose.24 There an owner of land conveyed 
such to a grantee subject to a promise regarding the use of the land. The grantee subse-
quently transferred the land to his spouse who had full knowledge of the earlier promise. 
The spouse subsequently pursued designs to use the land for purposes plainly in contra-
vention of the promise. When the original covenantee-grantor sued for injunctive relief to 
prevent the violative use, the fact that the covenantee had no ownership of surrounding or 
adjoining lands that would warrant permitting the maintenance of the action for equitable 
relief was raised. Notwithstanding the covenantee’s position as the holder of but a mere 
benefit in gross, the court permitted injunctive relief to be sought. In doing so, it stressed 
the fact the spouse proceeded against the intended purpose with indisputable knowledge 
of the restrictive character of the earlier promise. As the court put it:  
 
When a vendee purchases with full notice of a valid agreement 
between his vendor and the original owner concerning the manner in 
which the property is to be occupied, it is but a reasonable and equitable 
requirement to hold him bound to abide by the contract under which the 
land was conveyed.25  
                                                 
 21. Staebler-Kempf Oil Co., 45 N.W.2d at 316. 
 22. Trosper v. Shoemaker, 227 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1949). 
 23. Id. at 178. 
 24. Van Sant v. Rose, 103 N.E. 194 (Ill. 1913). 
 25. Id. at 196. 
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Discounting the fact the covenantee-grantor no longer owned other properties that 
could have been benefited by the restrictive promise, the court said that while it was true 
that “a bill to enjoin [a] breach of restrictive covenants cannot be maintained by one having 
no connection with or interest in their enforcement,” it could not “agree that [the] com-
plainants [involved] had no interest.”26 The court stated:  
 
They were the original covenantees, and by their conveyance of 
the property reserved an interest in it. They conveyed the property sub-
ject to that interest. They had a right to reserve such interest, and this 
right was not dependent upon the covenantees having other property in 
the vicinity that would be affected by a breach of the covenants, or that 
they should in any other manner sustain damages thereby.27 
  
The court continued by observing “the right to enjoin the breach of restrictive cove-
nants does not depend upon whether the covenantee will be damaged by the breach, but 
the mere breach is sufficient ground for interference by injunction.”28 The sum and sub-
stance would appear to be that the Illinois court was more interested in holding an original 
covenantor’s successor-in-interest to a clear promise of which they had knowledge, and 
which dealt with lands they took by later transfer, than in insisting that the only such prom-
ises capable of running to such a successor were those giving rise to a corresponding ben-
efit that could be characterized as real or appurtenant (rather than in gross) because found 
to touch other lands. 
There is also the somewhat more recent decision from the Court of Appeals of Mis-
souri, Christiansen v. Casey.29 The facts relative to that decision involved a developer of 
a subdivision imposing on each of the lots in the development a restriction clearly capable 
of attaching to the land. The restriction concerned fencing on the lots and the need for 
approval of such to be obtained from the developer. Following the imposition of the re-
striction, each of the lots was actually sold to the purchasers, not by the developer, but by 
the builder who presumably had obtained the restricted lots from the developer. The ques-
tion confronted by the court was whether, after having divested itself of all the lots in the 
subdivision, the developer-grantor could continue to claim a benefit it was able to enforce 
at equity in an action for injunction. The court acknowledged that, once the developer had 
transferred the lots to the builder and then to particular grantees, any appurtenant or real 
benefit arising initially from the imposition of the restriction necessarily converted into an 
in gross or personal benefit. The court then dealt with the issue of a grantor-covenantee 
possessing a purely personal or in gross benefit using that as the basis for a cause of action 
to enforce the restriction’s burden against end purchasers who were apparent successors 
to the intermediate builder. 
It is important to call attention to the fact that the developer seeking the injunction 
                                                 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Christiansen v. Casey, 613 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981). 
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also had retained other nearby lots outside the restricted subdivision. That fact certainly 
softened any reluctance the court had towards permitting the developer to proceed. None-
theless, it is incontestable that the court’s opinion contains a surfeit of language stressing 
that, in Missouri, one taking property with full knowledge that it is subject to an appurte-
nant restriction cannot escape it simply by showing that a grantor-covenantee seeking to 
enforce it has nothing more than a personal or in gross benefit. Citing to an earlier decision, 
the court observed that, as long as a restriction attaching to land is otherwise valid, any 
“distinction between real and personal covenants would be inconsequential.”30 Further, if 
the restriction is deemed a valid real covenant, it would prove binding, while “[i]f it is to 
be designated a personal [benefit] covenant, it would likewise [prove] bind[ing] . . . Mis-
souri aligns itself with the states which allow the original grantor to enforce a restrictive 
covenant when the covenantor has actual or constructive knowledge of the restriction.”31 
Again, while the quoted language speaks of knowledge on the part of the “covenantor,” as 
the lots in the subdivision were not sold to the concerned defendant in this case by the 
actual developer, it would appear the original covenantor was actually the builder, who 
then subsequently sold to the defendant, thus making the application of the court’s ap-
proach—and its consequent emphasis on notice—an application to the successor-in-inter-
est to the original covenantor. Of most importance, though, is the emphasis the court 
placed on notice or knowledge of the restriction which a party with an in gross or personal 
benefit is attempting to enforce. 
No court decisions have been found in Oklahoma directly analyzing whether an ap-
purtenant burden is capable of running to a successor-in-interest of the burdened land when 
the benefit flowing from the burden fails to touch and concern land held by the party pros-
ecuting the cause, and, instead, simply benefits that entity personally, whether in a finan-
cial, or in another fashion. Despite this absence, there is at least one case in which the court 
upheld the ability of a covenantee to seek injunctive relief and, in doing so, used language 
obviously reminiscent of what courts in those jurisdictions favorably disposed to enforce 
appurtenant burdens accompanied by in gross or personal benefits have utilized. Blackard 
v. Good32 concerned the enforceability of a restriction designed to protect the ambience of 
subdivided and developed lands. When the original owner-covenantee was approached 
about selling a tract within the subdivision to one who was thinking about developing the 
tract as an animal hospital, it was made clear to the prospective purchaser that a sale would 
not be consummated. Thereafter, another person bought the tract and subsequently sold it 
to a further intermediary acting on the behalf of the originally spurned purchaser. After the 
acquisition, plans were made to proceed with the animal hospital. The original owner-
covenantee objected, noting that it had imposed clear written restrictions regarding per-
mitted and prohibited uses of the land, and that all who had acquired interests in the land 
took with knowledge of the restrictions. In agreeing with the covenantee, the court, in 
reliance on an earlier case, noted that: “The precise form or nature of the covenant or 
agreement is quite immaterial. It is not essential that it should run with the land.  A personal 
covenant or agreement will be held valid and binding in equity on a purchaser taking the 
                                                 
 30. Id. at 910. 
 31. Id.  
 32. Blackard v. Good, 248 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1952). 
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estate with notice.”33 
Just as in Christiansen, Van Sant, Staebler-Kempf, and Pratte, the court in Blackard 
indicated the single most powerful piece of evidence in an action at equity to enforce an 
appurtenant burden is notice of the burden on the part of the covenantor or its successors-
in-interest. From the language the court relied upon, at equity even covenant’s deemed 
personal, and not capable of running under strict rules governing real covenants at law, 
can be enforced in a suit for injunctive relief in the event the burden of the covenant or 
restriction is one of which clear and unquestioned notice is had. While it is indisputable 
that the facts involved in Blackard do not concern the narrow situation of the runnability 
of an appurtenant burden in a case in which the accompanying benefit happens to be purely 
personal, there can be no doubt that in discussing the availability of injunctive relief to a 
covenantee who has imposed a plainly appurtenant burden on a covenantor, the central 
consideration is whether that covenantor, or its successors, are fully apprised of the re-
striction under which they must operate. 
Allowing enforcement of an appurtenant burden, when such is sought by one holding 
the consequent benefit in gross, seems unobjectionable under the Restatement (Third) of 
the Law of Property (Servitudes).34 Nothing in that recapitulating and change-prompting 
articulation of the governing law suggests opposition to allowing a burden clearly designed 
to touch and concern lands to run, whenever such gives rise to a corresponding benefit that 
plainly does nothing more than serve the personal interest of a particular promisee or cov-
enantee. Preferring to speak in terms of servitudes, rather than the more traditional, time-
honored, and commonly used appellations of real covenants and equitable servitudes, sec-
tion 8.1 of the Restatement provides that “[a] person who holds the benefit of a servi-
tude . . . has a legal right to enforce the servitude,” and that “[o]wnership of land intended 
to benefit from enforcement of the servitude is not a prerequisite to enforcement.”35 As the 
section goes on to provide, “a person who holds the benefit of [such] a covenant in gross” 
and seeks to enforce the accompanying burden must nonetheless be able to “establish a 
legitimate interest in enforcing the covenant.”36 Section 8.3 follows this by indicating that 
the remedies available to enforce servitudes include “any appropriate remedy or combina-
tion of remedies, . . . includ[ing] declaratory judgment, compensatory [and other forms of] 
damages . . . injunctions, restitution, and imposition of liens.”37 
The obvious effect is to permit courts to direct the payment to a covenantee of any 
promised monies associated with burdens triggered by specified uses of the lands con-
cerned. It would not matter that the entity to whom such monies were to be paid only has 
what would be described as a benefit in gross. As long as the burden were one seen as 
appurtenant to land, and the promisee or covenantee seeking enforcement were said to 
have a legitimate interest in enforcing such, then no reason would exist for insulating any 
entity in possession of such land from action by the promisee. There is no reason to believe 
the requisite interest in enforcement would be absent in situations in which it is the original 
                                                 
 33. Id. at 598 (emphasis added). 
 34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.5 (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 35. See id. § 8.1 (emphasis added).  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. § 8.3. 
ZEDALIS_4.27.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/27/2016  4:56 PM 
2016]  PROPERTY LAW PRINCIPLES 767 
promisee who seeks prosecution of the enforcement action. The principal drafter of the 
Restatement’s two volumes on servitudes seems favorably disposed to finding that such 
an interest in enforcement would exist whenever the original promisee or covenantee con-
tinues to hold lands in close proximity to, but outside, a subdivision which the promisee 
had placed under restriction.38 Thus, it would seem reasonable to consider the fact that an 
original promisee continues to claim the right to insist upon the enforcement of an in gross 
benefit involving a cash payment as a similarly sufficient interest.39 Equally as important, 
it would seem the Restatement considers irrelevant the fact that the original covenantor or 
promisor taking on the burden of money payment subsequently transfers the burdened land 
to a successor-in-interest. As section 5.2 of the Restatement’s volumes on servitudes pro-
vides, “an appurtenant . . . burden runs to all subsequent owners and possessors of the . . . 
burdened property.”40 Indeed, the reason underpinning this resides in the Restatement’s 
section 5.1 reiteration of the long-standing common law rule that “[a]n appurtenant . . . 
burden . . . passes automatically with the [passage of] the property interest to which it is 
appurtenant.”41 As any burden that is real or appurtenant attaches itself to lands concerned, 
it necessarily and instantaneously transfers to one to whom the land itself transfers. 
Especially instructive in connection with Restatement section 8.1’s indication of the 
enforceability of an appurtenant burden, notwithstanding its accompaniment by a benefit 
in gross, are both the section’s official Comments and the Reporter’s Note.42 After provid-
ing a brief background on the historical antecedents of the traditional opposition to en-
forcement of appurtenant burdens by one holding a mere benefit in gross, Comment (a) 
provides that the “rule requiring land ownership as a prerequisite to enforcement has be-
come obsolete.”43 The function the rule served was to assure that the person seeking en-
forcement had a genuine interest to protect, and that rather than adopting a flat prohibition 
on enforcement by persons holding mere benefits in gross, a “substitute rule requiring the 
beneficiary of a covenant in gross to establish a legitimate interest as a prerequisite” was 
preferable.44 Comment (c) on the exact same section follows this up by noting that such 
legitimate interest would exist in the context of a so-called conservation servitude in the 
event enforcement would advance the servitude’s purpose.45 It continues by observing that 
“[o]ther covenants in gross are more like simple contracts, and should be subject to the 
usual requirements for establishing the right to sue for breach of contract.”46 The latter 
would plainly appear to be present in an instance in which a money payment obligation 
has been taken-on by a covenantor-transferee of certain lands who has committed to render 
up a fee for specified energy related uses of the lands concerned. In further explicating 
                                                 
 38. Susan French, Highlights of the New Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. 
& TR. J. 225, 230 (2000). 
 39. It bears noting, however, that the Restatement section 7.12 does place a limit on the length of time any 
such money payment obligation endure. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.12 (AM. LAW. 
INST. 2000).   
 40. See id. § 5.2. 
 41. See id. § 5.1. 
    42.   Id. § 8.1. 
 43. Id. § 8.1 cmt. a. 
 44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 8.1 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 2000). 
   45.  Id. § 8.1 cmt. c. 
 46. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Comment (c), the Reporter’s Note observes the requirement of a “legitimate interest in 
enforcement of the servitude is intended to provide a . . . means of preventing opportunis-
tic use of servitude violations for extortion or other improper purposes.”47 It is beyond 
question that, when an original covenantee or promisee seeks enforcement of the kind of 
payment obligation with which we are here concerned, the idea is far from extortion or 
some other improper purpose. Nothing more than the honoring of a solemn contractual 
promise is the goal of the enforcement action. It bears calling attention to the fact that the 
Reporter’s Note accompanying the earlier section 2.6 of the Restatement indicates the case 
law in the country “show[s] that [,while some authority exists to the contrary,] covenant 
benefits in gross are recognized and enforced in a variety of contexts.”48 In light of the fact 
that there is some case law in Oklahoma applying various principles articulated in the 
Restatement (Third) when it comes to servitudes, including a concurring opinion in a 2002 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma decision, it would not seem beyond the pale to imagine that 
formulation of the law is being looked to for guidance in deciding how to resolve a problem 
such as that posed in this essay.49 
III. UNCERTAINTY OF PAYMENT AND THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 
Apart from the matter of the runnability of the payment burden when it is accompa-
nied by a benefit that is personal or in gross is the other matter of the rule against perpetu-
ities and its affect on the payment obligation given that the obligation itself is uncertain, if 
ever, to occur. Again, in the context of assumed energy related uses of the subject land, 
the uncertainty of any payment of money would be based on a promise that, in the event 
the land concerned be used for some specified energy activity (e.g., the placement of oil 
storage tanks, solar collection arrays, wind turbines), then, and only then, would the obli-
gation to pay be triggered. The unpredictability of whether the concerned land would ever 
be used for the particular specified energy related activity obligating money payment thus 
raises the possibility of an entity, generations removed from those originally creating the 
obligation, insisting on entitlement to claim its benefit. As the rule against perpetuities 
aims at uncertainties that vest distant in time, it would be natural to assume that any prom-
ise to pay based on the possible and eventual use of land for specified energy related ac-
tivities would become ensnared within the rule’s many complexities. 
The rule against perpetuities is clearly designed to affect interests that vest, if ever, 
too distantly in time. In doing so, it removes impediments to alienability, and prevents 
control over wealth being exercised by those who have long since passed away. A classic 
statement of the court-made rule dating from the seventeenth century declares an interest 
not to be good unless it must vest, if at all, no later than twenty-one years after some life 
in being at the creation of the interest.50 Though deceptively simple in its statement, the 
rule harbors innumerable complexities that one of the rule’s scholars characterized as a 
“technically-ridden legal nightmare” that can prove a “dangerous instrumentality in the 
                                                 
 47. Id. § 8.1, rptr.’s note. 
 48. Id. § 2.6, rptr.’s note. 
 49. Beattie v. State ex rel. Grand River Dam Auth., 41 P.3d 377 (Okla. 2002)(J. Opala, concurring); Marger-
ison v. Charter Oak Homeowners Ass’n, 283 P.3d 973 (Okla. Civ. App. 2010). 
 50. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (1942). 
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hands of most members of the bar.”51 
While the nature of any promise made by a transferee or conveyee of land to make 
money payment in the event the transferred land is used for a specified energy related 
activity seems subject to the rule, there are several reasons why it would not apply. The 
first has to do with the fact that the rule against perpetuities would only apply to interests 
in land,52 that might be described as contingent remainders or executory interests.53 And, 
since the interest in land transferred in the context of our situation, involving specified 
energy related activity, is most appropriately described as a vested interest accompanied 
by a contractual promise that might produce revenues for some beneficiary, in the event 
the specified activity occurs, the situation would fall beyond the rule’s reach. The land 
interest transferred is neither a contingent remainder nor an executory interest. There is 
nothing about the transferred interest that suggests it represents, as a contingent remainder 
would, the balance of an estate in land that the conveyor wishes to remain away from her 
after less than the entire estate has been transferred away to another. There is also nothing 
in the transferred interest that suggests, as an executory interest would, that the conveyor 
wishes to transfer an estate to another upon a condition that can cause its divestment, with 
some follow-on interest then commencing in a third person. Instead, the transfer involved 
in our case concerns an estate in land that is passed to a conveyee who merely promises 
that, whoever then owns the lands, will pay money in the event the land conveyed be put 
to use by the then owner for the specified energy related activity. Again, rather than the 
standard interest in land upon a contingency that thereby triggers the rule against perpetu-
ities, we have a vested interest in land, accompanied by a contractual promise to pay money 
if the land transferred ever be used for certain identified activity. 
There are a couple of Oklahoma Supreme Court decisions that are illustrative of 
precisely the distinction just referenced. Producers Oil Co. v. Gore,54 handed down in 
1980, involved an oil and gas lease in which the lessor and so-called operator, Producers, 
agreed to provide a fractional shared interest in the lease to a non-operating partner, Gore. 
In the separate, fractional share-transferring operating agreement between Producers and 
Gore, the two partners provided for a right of first refusal or preemptive right that would 
have permitted either of the two, in the event either decided to sell their interests, to pur-
chase that interest from the other. When a question arose regarding whether any such in-
terest subject to the court described preemptive rights fell within the terms of the rule 
against perpetuities, the court took great pains to resort to language that emphasized the 
nature of interests within the reach of the rule, and interests falling outside its scope. 
Clearly, whether the preemptive right involved in the case would ever be triggered could 
be described as contingent and uncertain to occur, thus making it a right that might be 
thought within the rule’s ambit. After all, at the time of its creation and even afterwards, 
                                                 
 51. Barton Leach, Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (1954). 
 52. On the application of the rule to personal property as well, see THOMAS F. BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, 
PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 205 (1984). 
 53. On the inapplicability of the rule to possibilities of reverter and rights of reentry see Schaefers v. Apel, 
295 Ala. 277, 328 So. 2d 274 (1976); Laurel v. Powers, 366 So. 2d 1079 (Miss. 1979); Cnty Sch. Bd. v. Dowell, 
190 Va. 676, 58 S.E.2d 38 (1950); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS. § 1.4 cmt. c 
(1983).  
 54. Producers Oil Co. v. Gore, 610 P.2d 772 (Okla. 1980). 
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there was absolutely no way of knowing if either partner would desire, at some future point 
in time, to sell its interest.55 Yet, notwithstanding this contingency, the court went out of 
its way to note that not all contingent interest’s come within the rule’s condemnation. As 
the court put it, the rule “concerns rights of property only, and does not affect the making 
of contracts.”56 Continuing, the court noted that “[i]f Operator’s and Non-Operator’s rights 
under the preemptive provision do not create property rights but are merely contractual, 
the rule would not apply.”57 Having stressed this distinction, the court then invoked the 
fact the preemptive right could not, in any event, possibly be considered violative of the 
rule, because of an exception regarding preemptive rights that are found, as here, not to 
extend beyond the duration of the basic lease itself. 
The distinction drawn by the court in Producers Oil Co. between property rights 
subject to the rule, and contract rights not subject thereto, was relied upon in that case for 
explaining why, in a decision rendered thirteen years earlier by the same court, it was 
determined that a preemptive right regarding an oil and gas lease was within the rule’s 
reach. In the earlier case of Melcher v. Camp, the facts were slightly, yet quite importantly, 
different from those involved in Producers.58 In Melcher, there was, again, an oil and gas 
lease. However, it was the fee simple owner, lessor of the land that was the subject of the 
lease that was involved in the legal dispute with the lessee. According to the terms of the 
lease, the lease rights applied only to those geologic strata above 5,500 feet in depth, with 
the fee owner, lessor retaining all rights to strata below that depth. Both the lessor and 
lessee also entered into a separate preemptive agreement whereby the fee owner, lessor 
agreed that if it ever desired to subject the strata below 5,500 feet in depth a lease, it would 
provide the lessee with the right of first refusal.59 
While much can be made of various differences between the facts of Producers as 
opposed to those in Melcher, the most determinative difference, and the one emphasized 
by the court in Producers, concerned the nature of the interest that was tied-up with the 
uncertainty or contingency that might be thought to activate the strictures of the rule 
against perpetuities. The contingency in Producers was that it was unclear when, if ever, 
either the non-operating or the operating partner holding fractional share interests in the 
lease would want to sell their respective interests.60 In Melcher, the contingency was when, 
if ever, the fee owner, lessor would ever want to subject the strata below 5,500 feet to lease 
rights.61 Unquestionably, both cases involved a contingency that might make one think of 
the rule against perpetuities.62 As the court in Producers emphasized, however, the con-
tingent interest could be seen as involving a mere contractual right—the separate, frac-
tional share-transferring operating agreement between the Producers Oil Co. (the lessee/
                                                 
 55. It should be observed that, despite this fact, given that the contingency would have occurred during the 
life of the partners, the twenty-one year time period for vesting under the rule would have been nonetheless 
satisfied. 
 56. Gore, 610 P.2d at 774 (emphasis added). 
 57. Id.  
 58. Melcher v. Camp, 435 P.2d 107 (Okla. 1967). 
 59. Id. (providing a description of the facts). 
    60.   Gore, 610 P.2d 772. 
    61.   Melcher, 435 P.2d 107. 
    62.   Id.; Gore, 610 P.2d 772. 
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operator) and its partner, Gore (the non-operator).63 And, as the same court pointed out, 
the contingent interest in Melcher involved a property right—the separate commitment by 
the fee owner, lessor vesting the lessee with the preemptive right of first refusal to acquire 
a lease to the strata below 5,500 feet in the event the lessor were to ever desire to subject 
strata at such depth to oil and gas activity.64 
Closely related to the contingency in the Producers case is that involved in the prob-
lem with which we are here concerned. While clear that the uncertainty of whether the 
money payment obligation will be triggered by use of certain transferred lands for speci-
fied energy related activity, it is beyond dispute that the uncertainty is linked not to an 
interest in property that can be described as a contingent remainder or executory interest. 
Instead, the interest in property transferred by the conveyor-promisee is an interest that is 
plainly vested, with the conveyee-promisor taking on an adjunct payment promise that 
may never produce because of the contractual contingency upon which it depends. 
A second reason for viewing the promise to pay of concern here as not within the 
scope of the rule against perpetuities has to do with the basic constructional preference 
given to language in legal instruments that might be thought of as tripping the rule’s in-
validating features. Justice Opala’s supplemental opinion on rehearing in the 1987 Okla-
homa Supreme Court case of Matter of Estate of Crowl, is particularly instructive in that 
regard.65 The facts of that case involved a situation in which an individual, vendor, who 
subsequently died, had earlier entered into an option contract, exercisable upon the ven-
dor’s death, to sell additional acreage to a vendee-optionee. The executor of the vendor’s 
estate then refused to honor that option, claiming, among other things, the invalidity of the 
option under the rule against perpetuities. Opala’s opinion on rehearing points out that the 
option involved in the case was plainly valid under the rule. After all, by its very nature, it 
would not only be exercised during the lifetime of the optionee, but would be exercised at 
the time of the death of the vendor, optionor—let alone within twenty-one years of the 
optionor’s death. But more significantly for present purposes, Opala makes clear that Ok-
lahoma law has a strong constructional preference for avoiding the invalidation of grants 
that might otherwise be seen as violative of the limitation on perpetuities.66 The implica-
tion of the latter is that every grant raising a question under the rule against perpetuities 
should, if at all possible, be construed (or reformed by the court) in a way that assures it 
comports with the dictates of the rule. Fundamentally in that regard, all grants containing 
contingencies are to be scrutinized sedulously. And, in no circumstance should a grant be 
found within the scope of the rule simply because of the existence of a contingency. The 
rule against perpetuities only affects contingent grants of property rights, and not contin-
gent grants of contract rights. Thus, the contractual nature of a promise to pay money in 
the event transferred lands wind up being used for some specified energy related activity 
should never be enough, just because of its contingent and uncertain to occur quality, to 
cause the promise to pay to be subjected to the rule. 
                                                 
    63.   Gore, 610 P.2d 772. 
 64. Melcher, 435 P.2d at 108-09. See also Trecker v. Langel, 298 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1980)(not reaching the 
perpetuities question, but noting that if it were to apply, it would have to be determined whether the rule actu-
ally reached preemption rights that are intended to be personal). 
 65. In re Crowl, 737 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1987). 
 66. Id. 
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This constructional preference for construing grants containing some contingency 
as consistent with what the rule against perpetuities demands certainly suggests that the 
contingency confronted in the context of a grant of land, accompanied by a promise to pay 
money in the event the land is put to some specified energy related use, should, if at all 
possible, be seen as neither violative of the rule, nor even within its scope. As recounted 
in the several paragraphs above, in the absence of the constructional preference utilized in 
Oklahoma, there remains ample reason to believe that the promise to pay money based on 
the eventuation of the contingency of transferred lands being used for certain energy re-
lated activities does not even fall within the reach of what the rule is designed to cover. To 
reiterate, involved here is a contractual promise, not a contingent interest in property. 
When that reality conjoins with a constructional preference tilting against invalidation un-
der the rule, there would appear every reason to try and read the energy related promise to 
pay in a manner consistent with the prescriptions the rule establishes. 
Section 3.3 of the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes provides yet a third 
reason for conceiving of the promise to pay associated with energy related activities as not 
within the ambit of the rule against perpetuities.67 That section clearly states: “The rule 
against perpetuities does not apply to servitudes or powers to create servitudes.”68 As dis-
cussed at length earlier in this essay, the Restatement uses the term servitudes to include 
all those restrictions or conditions on the use of land the common law had long character-
ized as either real covenants or as equitable servitudes. The promise of present concern—
the payment of money in the event land transferred to the conveyee-promisor is used for 
particular energy related activities—falls into that category, and has been examined at 
length in Part II of this essay from the vantage of the rules affecting the runnability of a 
covenant or a servitude to successors in interest to the originally contracting parties. 
In explication of the Restatement (Third’s) declaration not to apply the rule against 
perpetuities to servitudes, it is observed in the comments accompanying section 3.3 that 
evolution in the law has been occurring in the courts of many jurisdictions since the 
1980s.69 Further, the Reporter’s Notes also observe that there are numerous factual situa-
tions which suggest the wisdom of not applying the perpetuities rule to servitudes.70 In-
deed, various court decisions are in accord with that exact approach. An example closely, 
but not completely, related to the sort of covenant or servitude of instant concern here—a 
promise to pay money conditioned upon the use of lands for certain energy activities—
involved a homeowners’ association assessment found not to violate the rule against per-
petuities.71 While the assessment imposed on homeowners in that case was not of the con-
tingent, conditional, or uncertain to occur nature characterizing the promise to pay in our 
case concerning energy related uses of land, the court involved held it did not matter that 
the assessment obligation extended beyond the period traditionally and under the relevant 
statute specified as a perpetuity as the interest in land to which the obligation attached was 
                                                 
 67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).   
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. § 3.3 cmt. b.  
 70. Id. § 3.3, rptr.’s note. 
 71. Kell v. Bella Vista Vill. Prop. Owners Ass’n, 528 S.W.2d 651 (Ark. 1975). 
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a vested interest.72 In another example, an agreement to restore quarrying affected land to 
its original condition upon the completion of mining activity on a parcel adjacent another 
parcel held by the agreement’s beneficiary was similarly held not subject to the rule against 
perpetuities.73 Here, unlike in the preceding case, the court found the agreement’s restora-
tion obligation to be contingent or conditional upon the cessation of quarrying activities. 
It then went on and held the beneficiary of the agreement possessed an interest in land 
indisputably vested as of the time of the agreement’s making, thus taking the agreement 
outside the ambit of the perpetuities rule.74 
Besides the three preceding reasons for finding the rule against perpetuities inappli-
cable to a promise to pay money in the event transferred land is used by the transferee for 
specified energy related activities, a fourth and final reason also exists. Though not aware 
of cases in other jurisdictions that are precisely identical with the factual situation of in-
stant concern in this essay, there are a couple of closely similar cases in which promises 
to pay money have been held not affected by the rule on perpetuities. The implication of 
these similar cases is that, it is not wholly beyond the realm of reasonableness to consider 
the view that the rule does not apply to promises to pay money in the event transferred 
land is used for certain energy related activities as completely consonant with the rule’s 
overall aim of targeting contingencies. Such promises to pay undoubtedly involve a con-
tingency that is uncertain or speculative in nature. But as the rule against perpetuities is 
triggered only when what is concerned is a transfer of a contingent interest in land, prom-
ises to pay on a contingency involving energy related uses of land fail to implicate the rule. 
Importantly, the case of Cloud v. Ass’n of Owners, Satellite Apt. Bldg., Inc., a 1992 
decision out of Colorado, arrives at just that conclusion.75 There a transferee of lands prom-
ised to make payments to a transferor-promisee calculated on the basis of a percentage of 
the future rental amounts secured from occupants. The uncertain nature of the actual 
amount, if any, that would be paid by the promisor to the promisee, and the fact that the 
promise was not limited in its duration, was said not to be violative of rule against perpe-
tuities. In the estimation of the court, the property interest involved in the case was vested 
and, therefore, outside the rule’s reach.76 Even more significant, from the standpoint of 
similarity to the situation of instant concern in this essay, is the 1975 case of Kleinheider 
v. Phillips Pipe Line Co.77 There a transferee-promisor of an energy pipeline easement 
committed to pay additional monies to the transferor-promisee in the event the transferee-
promisor used the easement for additional energy pipelines. Despite the fact the promise 
to pay connected to a certain additional energy related use that was uncertain to occur, it 
was decided that rule against perpetuities was not violated given that the easement granted 
was vested when originally conveyed.78  
In both Cloud and Kleinheider, there existed promises to pay money, just as in the 
                                                 
 72. Id. at 760. 
 73. Moody v. Bayer Constr. Co., 627 P.2d 1171 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). 
 74. Id. at 278. 
 75. Cloud v. Ass’n of Owners, Satellite Apt. Bldg., Inc., 857 P.2d 435 (Colo. 1992). 
 76. Id. at 438. 
 77. Kleinheider v. Phillips Pine Line Co., 528 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1975). 
 78. Id. at 844. 
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instant situation with which we have here been concerned.79 Further, they both also in-
volved promises to pay that had their obligation triggered by some event that was contin-
gent or uncertain to occur. Nonetheless, both cases found that, in spite of the existence of 
some contingency, nothing about the situations resulted in a violation of the rule against 
perpetuities.80 The rule clearly applies in the context of contingencies. Yet it only applies 
whenever the nature of a contingency is one that involves a property interest; not when it 
involves a mere contractual interest that is contingent. Cloud and Kleinheider both in-
volved property interests considered vested, with the only contingencies there present in-
volving mere contractual promises regarding the payment of money on certain conditions. 
In that respect, both cases are perfectly consistent with what has been suggested regarding 
a conveyee-promisor’s promise to pay money in the event transferred land is used for 
specified energy related activity.81 There can be no question that a promise of that sort is 
based on a contingency. What is needed to activate the rule against perpetuities, however, 
is not simply a contingency, but a contingent property interest. It is not enough that a con-
tingent contractual commitment be all that is involved. The rule is only triggered whenever 
it is a property interest that is based upon a contingency. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Taken together, the collectivity of the analysis reflected in the current essay, and that 
presented in this journal’s earlier volume,82 make clear that promises to pay money, if 
transferred land is used for specified energy-related activity, are enforceable against suc-
cessors-in-interest to the land bearing that particular burden. The rule against perpetuities 
certainly seems to provide no obstacle to enforcement. After all, it aims at transfers of 
contingent interests in property, not at transfers of vested interests accompanied by ancil-
lary contractual commitments of a contingent sort. Exactly the same thing is capable of 
being said about the fact the promise of payment involves an in gross or personal benefit. 
Clearly, ample law appears to support the running of such as a servitude, even though an 
appurtenant burden gives rise to a benefit that happens not to touch and concern lands. 
Increasing demands for energy may, in the future, require the utilization of greater 
amounts of land for energy related activities. Many of these activities could vary consid-
erably from traditional extractive efforts in which exploiters of energy resources have his-
torically been engaged. They could involve everything from the construction of oil storage 
tanks, to the erection of wind turbines or solar arrays. Owners of land of interest to such 
exploitative enterprises may be willing to transfer land to which they have title, but only 
on the condition that the occurrence of certain specified energy related activities result in 
the making of money payments to the original transferor-promisee, or another to whom an 
interest in payments has been assigned or conveyed. There appears to exist nothing about 
such payment promises that would frustrate their enforcement. Much in the mysteries of 
the law of real covenants and equitable servitudes would support that position.83 And, as 
                                                 
    79.   Id.; Cloud, 857 P.2d at 435. 
    80.   Kleinheider, 528 F.2d 837; Cloud, 857 P.2d 435.  
    81.   Kleinheider, 528 F.2d 837; Cloud, 857 P.2d 435. 
 82. Zedalis, supra note 1. 
 83. Id. 
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indicated in the preceding pages, neither the basic notion in property law that the in gross 
or personal nature of a benefit can affect the runnability of an otherwise appurtenant bur-
den, nor the rule against perpetuities that targets contingencies, would seem inconsistent 
with that view. Especially would that appear the case under Oklahoma law, and when the 
payment burden is seen from the perspective of the law of servitudes. 
 
